WONDERING WHERE THE LIONS ARE?

Putting Leadership Back into Strategy

BY

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Lieutenant Colonel J. William “Bill” DeMarco is a fellow at the Hoover Institution of War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University, CA. After graduation from The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, he attended Undergraduate Pilot Training at Reese AFB, Texas, before beginning his first operational flying tour in the C-23A Sherpa at Zweibrucken AB, Germany in early 1989. After a short tour in Europe and the closure of Zweibrucken, he trained on the C-12F stationed at Norton AFB, California. After 18 months and another base closure he moved to March AFB, California with the C-12F and attained the rating of Flight Examiner. Following the C-12, and the closure of March AFB, he transferred to the C-141B at Charleston AFB, South Carolina. While there, he upgraded to instructor and held qualifications in Special Operations Low Level (SOLLII), airdrop, boat drop, CDS delivery and Air Refueling. After Charleston he held positions at HQ AMC, Scott AFB IL, as the Chief of Contingency Airlift plans in Special Missions, TACC/XOOS, Deputy Chief of the Commander’s Action Group TACC/CCX, Chief Short Notice Air Refueling Requirements TACC/XOOKS and Assistant Executive Officer to the AMC Commander AMC/CCEA. After Scott AFB, he cross-trained to the KC-10A at Travis AFB, where he served as Chief Pilot, Assistant Director of Operations and Instructor Pilot for the 9th ARS. Major DeMarco completed Air Command and Staff College at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, in June 2003 and remained there to attend the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies the following year. Upon graduation he was assigned to the 715 AMS, Travis AFB, California as the Director of Operations. In January 2005, Lieutenant Colonel DeMarco assumed command of the 15th Air Mobility Operations Squadron, where he served in that position until becoming a National Security Affairs Fellow at the Hoover Institution. A Command Pilot with over 2700hrs, he also holds three masters degrees in Military Arts and Science, American Military University, VA, Military Operational Art and Science, Air University, AL, and Airpower Art and Science from the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Maxwell AFB, AL. Following his time at Stanford, he will go on to J5, Strategic Plans and Programs at the Joint Staff, Pentagon. LtCol DeMarco is married to the former Sundie Lark Walton, and God has blessed them with three children: Joseph Lukas, Harrison, and Maximus.
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As in all things, I thank God for bringing me to this point and seeing me through this very exciting year here at Stanford and the Hoover Institution.

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ABSTRACT

16 July 1953...less than three months after becoming President Dwight D. Eisenhower met with his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, in the Solarium Room of the White House. The world, at the time, looked to be taking a turn for toward communism. Eisenhower long believed that the best way to formulate national policy in a democracy was to gather the best qualified people with opposing views and carefully listen to them debate the issue at hand.

The 21st Century’s generational struggle brings a specter of similarities of the Cold War. The enemy and ideology are different and, yet as in the early Cold War--today we face this enemy without a coherent strategy. This struggle is indeed complex, yet the lessons remain.

History provides answers for today’s leaders...this paper poses to explore lessons from the early years of the Cold War. The 1953 Project Solarium illustrates the difficulties associated with crafting long-term policies. Containment was not spontaneously created. With the prospect of this long war...it would be wise for policymakers to concentrate their efforts on first designing a comprehensive process for defining and prioritizing America's long-term objectives, then developing practical policies to achieve those objectives.

A proposed NSS for debate in a new Solarium structure to challenge geo-strategic concepts and shape the global environment: QUANTUM LOOK:

A) International Cultural and Spiritual Education and Understanding: Education—globally, we all need to understand each other better. The world is getting smaller and we need to understand Islamic culture... and the Muslim world must understand the West.

B) Alternative Energy Materialization: Lessen the power of oil—without the real power of oil—the mid east becomes irrelevant.

C) Nuclear Weapons Nullification: The US develops a realistic missile defense system and shares the technology with any nation interested—this removes bigger nuclear weapons from the table... nations such as Iran gaining nuclear weapons is less of an issue—although the US needs to engage and ensure that we keep the numbers of nuclear weapons down—the idea of a nuke missile landing on US soil is limited. Space based technology is required to assist in nuclear detection at ports to avoid the importation of a human dirty bomb.

President Bush, much like Truman has led in the initial phases of this new generational conflict and now a new administration must strategically plan the path America will blaze. Much akin to President Eisenhower taking the Oval Office from Truman, the next president must develop a plan for the future conduct of this conflict. One issue must resonate clearly; this is not just about the current situation in Iraq or Afghanistan. These countries are merely fronts in this war. The new strategy, must address the U.S.’s position in the world and its position as the current hegemon. America may not taunt others with that position, but recognition of the position and what America represents is of the utmost importance.
**Forward**

So where are the strong?
And who are the trusted?
And where is the harmony?
... What’s so funny about peace, love, and understanding?
- Elvis Costello

All of the great leaders have had one characteristic in common: it was the willingness to confront unequivocally the major anxiety of their people in their time.
- John Kenneth Galbraith

I have been dubbed an idealist in writing this paper, a title that I really have no problem with at all…except in the naivety of it. An idealist is defined as: a person who cherishes or pursues high or noble principles, purposes, goals, etc., a visionary or, possibly, an impractical person, a person who represents things as they might or should be rather than as they are.

As one looks over history, we see so many great leaders. Did these leaders know they were great at the time? Did they truly know the consequences of their decisions at the time they made them? In history there are leaders who possessed a deep understanding of strategy and could readily draw abstractions from history to their day and present bold and audacious ideas to their constituents, their troops, or their bosses. As I sat in Kabul, Afghanistan I had to ponder where these leaders are today. Were they right in front of me? Would I know one if I met him or her? It was in that effort and that time I decided to step out and write some ideas down and hence the birth of these thoughts.

The Idealist might say things like, "I see a better way. It ought to be done right. Ask not what your country can do for you, but what can you do for your country. I have a dream . . ."
Famous Idealists include Johan Sebastian Bach, Walt Disney, Galileo Galilei, Steven Hawking, Franz Josef Haydn, Ernest Hemingway, Bob Hope, Thomas Jefferson, Steven Jobs, Janis Joplin, Grace Kelly, Jacqueline Kennedy, President John F. Kennedy Jr., Martin Luther King Jr., Martin Luther, Paul McCartney, Michelangelo, Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, Oliver North, Steven Spielberg, Peter Tchaikovsky, Vincent Van Gogh, Frank Lloyd Wright.

Think about how Bach, Haydn, Mozart, Michelangelo, Tchaikovsky, Van Gogh, Steven Spielberg and Walt Disney changed the world through their ability to see a better way. Notice how President John Kennedy set a challenge that put a man on the moon ("Ask not what your country can do for you, but what you can do for your country") and how Martin Luther King Jr. forced a nation to look at itself ("I have a dream . . ."). Notice how some of the other famous people tried to achieve their ideal or naively found themselves in trouble.

By no means do I equate myself with any of the greats above. This paper is not one to go down in history as did their works, mine is only to ask the reader to remember the idealist, remember, those that ask tough questions, and ask where are the lions.
Chapter 1

Wondering Where the Lions Are

“Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory. Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat.” —Sun Tzu

Where there is no vision, the people perish - Proverbs 29:18 (KJV)

With the end of the Cold War in 1991, the United States of America became the most powerful nation on the planet—and one of the most powerful nations in human history. Yet nearly two decades later, the United States has failed to develop a strategy reflecting its new position. The collapse of the Soviet Union set off a massive shift in the tectonic plates of international politics. American policy brokers have yet to fully appreciate this fundamental change in the distribution of power. As such, the nation routinely confuses preferences with priorities—America exists in a state of true strategic ambiguity.

Over a half-decade of blue-ribbon panels, think-tank research, and expert commentary have made it quite clear—since the end of the Cold War, the nation has had no grand strategy. Why not? In his controversial article “A Failure of Generalship,” US Army Lieutenant Colonel Paul Yingling blames debacles such as the U.S. loss in Vietnam and our current crisis in Iraq on a failure of “an entire institution: America’s general officer corps.” Yingling further states, “American generals have failed to prepare our armed forces for the war and advise civilian authorities on the application of force to achieve the aims of policy.”

Iraq and Vietnam are merely operational symptoms of a much greater issue: not a failure US generals, but a failure of vision, imagination, audacity and of strategy provided from the highest levels of the US government as a whole. The current presidential administration in not the culprit here. Instead, America confronts a strategic break down in processes over a period of decades and Presidential administrations.

3 Ibid.
History clearly illustrates—no sole superpower or empire has existed very long before a nation-state or a coalition of states has arisen to defeat it. Rome, England, Spain, and France—all have had a fleeting time as a lone superpower. America is at a crossroads: it may find itself on the scrap heap of empire, or global civilization may conclude war is so dangerous and destructive that no nation can rise to counter American power. US leadership must deliberate each path with thoughtful consideration of the nation’s newly acquired position of dominant influence and visualize its global standing over the next 10 to 20 years.

The best way forward is often a look back. Today’s security strategy policymakers must examine lessons from the early days of America’s last generational struggle: the Cold War. History offers today’s strategic leaders insights as the country faces yet another generational conflict. America simultaneously confronts a global conflict, a presidential election, a generational change in senior military leadership, and emerging threats from other nations that might not share US interests. Strategic planning serves to synergize all of these agents of change. A cohesive strategy can propel the nation forward to yet unfathomed greatness—yet it requires, vision, and a clear path for future generations to aspire to.

The United States can ill afford to suffer another “lack of imagination.” In navigating these change agents, a roadmap is offered. First; the journey begins with the transition from the Truman to Eisenhower administrations—examining how the latter leveraged his successor’s triumphs while minimizing his shortcomings to bring forth the concepts of strategy that endured almost four decades. Second; leaders must grapple with the processes modern elected officials utilize in developing strategy today. Finally; if a leader unleashed his/her imagination and gathered the best and brightest from US government, military, academic, and the business world, what would American National Security Strategy look like? America deserves a quantum leap strategy looking beyond the current situation the nation now faces—what would the U.S. want the global landscape to look like in twenty years? These questions and dialog begin in the final chapter and attempt that quantum leap forward. Today’s leaders must embrace a vision now; start planning, learning from the past while visualizing the world of tomorrow.

The Making of Strategy:

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In 1948 George Kennan defined national security as “the continued ability of the country to pursue the development of its internal life without serious interference, or threat of interference, from foreign powers.” National Security Strategy is defined as the art and science of developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, military, and informational) to achieve objectives that contribute to national security. At times it is also referred to as national strategy or grand strategy. The definition sounds simple and as a science perhaps it is, but the art is the true puzzle. Leadership must develop a resonating vision, communicate those ideas, let the various instruments of power further develop the strategy inside of their perspective bureaucracies, and finally vet the concepts through the congress.

A strategy development process does exist, but it amounts to nothing without powerful leaders behind it. Some argue that every well-defined National Security Strategy is developed in response to a crisis. Crisis provides the incentive that demands not only strong leadership, but also imagination and a clearly communicated vision echoed throughout the US Government and people. Obviously with a bureaucratic government, politics are an enormous factor. This demands succinct leadership—leaders that place the greater good of the nation above personal power. In today’s political battlefields, political cooperation sounds close to impossible. People of goodwill and intelligence must place national interests above selfish personal ambition, political, or even organizational concerns if they are to serve America well with a coherent and appropriate strategy. Such efforts demand leaders with strong convictions, imagination and audacity, cut from a different fabric than that of the average person—A lion.

Lions & Leaders:

Stellar leaders throughout history earn the moniker of lion. George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, Franklin D Roosevelt, Ronald Reagan—names echoing in the halls of greatness and considered among the lions. Lions enjoy depiction in culture as strong and noble. Commonly represented as "king of the beasts"; the lion is a popular symbol of royalty and stateliness, as well as a symbol of bravery. "Lion" served as a nickname for medieval warrior rulers with a reputations for bravery, such as Richard I of England, or Richard the Lionheart,

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Henry the Lion, Duke of Saxony and Robert III of Flanders nicknamed "The Lion of Flanders" - a major Flemish national hero up to the present. William Manchester refers to Winston Churchill as “The Last Lion” in his 1988 book. In Christian tradition, the lion is often assumed to represent Jesus Christ, the Lion of Judah—by Christian faith the quintessential leader.

A few years ago I came across a song “Wondering Where the Lions Are” by Bruce Cockburn.7 The song may not define strategic leadership, but it did cause me to wonder, as I look around our political, military and diplomatic leadership… where are the lions?

The United States possesses the largest military, economic, and diplomatic capacity in the world--the metaphoric lion…in the global jungle. Yet, as Michèle A. Flournoy notes, “For a country that continues to enjoy an unrivalled global position, it is both remarkable and disturbing that the United States has no truly effective strategic planning process for national security.”8 Of course the world has changed in a highly accelerated manner during the last half century. The Cold War was metaphorically a deadly game of checkers, but in today’s world of globalization, radical religious ideology, and a 24 hour hyper-media—America is engaged in a four dimensional chess game, where moves against one’s opponents are sometimes made while glancing backwards into a mirror.

Which strategic direction the U.S. should adopt is the topic of many articles, augmented with a myriad of leadership books du jour filling the shelves at any bookstore or library. Where do leadership and the ability to visualize strategy come together? American democracy, by design, creates a bureaucratic road block of party politics in the creation of strategy. A leader who produces an unpopular strategic vision faces consequences in the polls and in the next election. Politicians tend to enslave themselves to polls; as such strategy can not be made in a democracy unless all parties agree on it. Hardly! Ronald Reagan, Harry Truman, and Dwight Eisenhower formulated strategies that lasted beyond their terms in office and were not popular with congress or, at times, their own political parties. Yet these lions achieved long lasting effects and advanced peace on earth due in part to their strategies.

This lion’s vocation is threefold. First, domestically—develop ideas, forming a vision that further coalesces into strategy. Next, gather, discuss, debate, dialog with others in the

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7 Bruce Cockburn, Dancing in the Dragon's Jaws, 1979 “Wondering Where the Lions Are”.
bureaucratic arena to ferment the best ideas and bring them onto the global stage. Finally, internationally—these same leaders must take that coherent strategy, and guide and direct these ideas through the jungle of bureaucracy in the world’s capitals.

There are three capabilities or concepts a strategic leader must possess to attract these domestic and international leaders. First a vision—the ability to articulate an inspiring picture of the future—powerful speeches are important, but anyone can produce a wish list. The political seasons of big elections make this extremely evident. Effective visions must accurately diagnose the world situation, balancing realism with risk and ideals with capabilities. The second is emotional intelligence, the self-knowledge and discipline that allow leaders to project personal magnetism. Finally, communication enables the leader to inspire both domestic and foreign audiences.9

A lion requires three additional abilities in the implementation of this strategy. Organizational capacity is the leader’s ability to manage structures of government to shape and implement policy, including supervising advisors in order to ensure a flow of accurate information regarding the inputs and outputs of decisions. Leaders, who lack organizational skills easily fall prey to the emperor’s trap, hearing only how beautiful are their new clothes. Second: political skill, the art of finding the means to achieve the ends set forth in one’s vision, whether by bargaining, buying or bullying, is crucial and engagement is key. A leader cannot achieve goals just for narrow groups of supporters; he/she must use successes to build political capital with wider circles of followers. Finally, a successful lion needs what theorists of business leadership call “contextual intelligence,” the ability to understand an evolving environment and to match resources with objectives by moving with rather than against the flow of events. Contextual intelligence allows a leader to act on hunches based on informed intuition.10

These concepts are important, but often it takes a crisis or a unique opportunity to free a leader from the constraints of pressure groups, bureaucratic inertia and the status quo. In the case of World War II and the Cold War, a perceived “death sentence” enabled Presidents to blaze new paths in strategy. In the absence of a crisis, even a significant threat may not galvanize public and institutional support for a leader’s strategy or vision.

10 Ibid.
The crisis of 9/11, at times, seems forgotten. Can the American media-dominated, democratic society, fixated on the short term and the next election—not wanting to give up or pay for anything—deal with a silent, slow-motion, long-term challenge that has no painful, palpable symptoms? Or does it require yet another crisis? And a costly crisis it would be. In the collective memory of the nation there is significant opportunity, albeit crisis, to propel a transformational vision for the United States through our next president, and this is the leadership challenge of the next US President.

George Kennan, in describing democracies and the roots of World War I, once said:

“But I sometimes wonder whether in this respect a democracy is not uncomfortably similar to one of those prehistoric monsters with a body as long as this room and a brain the size of a pin: he lies there in his comfortable primeval mud and pays little attention to his environment; he is slow to wrath — in fact, you practically have to whack his tail off to make him aware that his interests are being disturbed; but, once he grasps this, he lays about him with such blind determination that he not only destroys his adversary but largely wrecks his native habitat. You wonder whether it would not have been wiser for him to have taken a little more interest in what was going on at an earlier date and to have seen whether he could have prevented some of these situations from arising instead of proceeding from an undiscriminating indifference to a holy wrath equally undiscriminating.”

As a nation—the U.S. stands at a nexus, six years into this current conflict, very similar to where we stood six years into the Cold War. President Harry S. Truman departed office and handed the Containment Strategy to President Dwight D Eisenhower. Eisenhower took firm hold of those reins, reached across party lines, enabled Truman’s strategy to a much deeper and analytical level and launched the U.S. on a course that lead to eventual Cold War victory. The 1953 Solarium Project illustrates the difficulties associated with crafting long-term policies and today serves as an excellent case study. Containment was not spontaneously created. As policy cycles continue to accelerate and policy timelines are shortened, it is worth remembering that a policy which most textbooks now summarize in two sentences took six years to mature and forty more to implement. With the prospect of this long war…it would be wise for policymakers to

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12 Dan Reiter, Allan C Stam, Democracies at War, (Princeton Press, Princeton NJ, 1967) 118.
concentrate their efforts on first designing a comprehensive *process* for defining and prioritizing America's long-term objectives, *then* developing practical policies to achieve those objectives.
Chapter 2

The Peace of Solarium

“Study history, study history. In history lies all the secrets of statecraft”
-Winston Churchill

“That men do not learn very much from the lessons of history is the most important of all the lessons that history has to teach.”
-Aldous Huxley

Dwight D. Eisenhower campaigned on a basic theme; his administration, unlike the incumbent one, would formulate and pursue a coherent and effective “cold war’ national strategy.” Eisenhower promised an effective and cost efficient strategy with improved planning and coordination combined with the type of leadership he exercised in World War II. After a victorious campaign Eisenhower is found sitting in the White House solarium room with Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles. Both found much to discuss and even more to execute. After World War II, America literally came through the looking glass. The U.S. found itself adversaries with a wartime ally the Soviet Union. The United Kingdom gave way to the U.S. as the dominant Western hegemon and the global landscape was now defined in terms of democracy and totalitarianism. Further, Eisenhower faced the death of Josef Stalin, an ongoing conflict in Korea, and the rise of Soviet power in Eastern Europe. Not unlike the world America finds itself in today, facing strategic issues requiring careful, thoughtful consideration and strategic planning. The 21st Century enemies are different, harder to define, with no true red or blue lines on the map, but the lessons of yesterday prove useful to today’s leaders.

In World War IV, Norman Podhoretz draws an analogy from the experiences of Presidents George W. Bush to Harry S. Truman. A sound analogy in many respects, but in light of upcoming US elections, it is more apropos to examine a different one. There are similarities between the Truman and Bush administrations but as of January 2009 that is history. What about the future? The analogy worth noting is between America’s next president and Truman’s successor.

After World War II, war-weary Americans eager to return to peacetime pursuits helped shape threat assessment. President Harry S. Truman drastically cut military expenditures in the

late 1940s. The president was aware of the potential national security threat posed by the Soviet Union, however he assumed the United States’ preponderant military and economic power would serve as a deterrent to Soviet adventurism. Similarly, at the end of the Cold War, American citizens and politicians both sought a “peace dividend,” slashing the budgets of the US military, intelligence services and diplomatic corps throughout the 1990s. Today, American politicians and citizens challenge many of the decisions made in the 1990s through the War on Terror lens, and many ponder the basis for such choices. The President of tomorrow will confront leadership challenges very similar to those of the early Eisenhower administration.

**President Eisenhower—Context and Lessons for Today**

May 1953—Dwight D. Eisenhower, a war-hero, in the fourth month of his presidency faced a myriad of profound national security issues. U.N. and Communist forces fought the Korean War to a stalemate with an eventual thirty-five thousand Americans killed. Armistice negotiations were deadlocked. The United States entangled itself in an arms race with the Soviet Union and had recently detonated the world’s first hydrogen bomb. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization looked to create a European defense community and failed due to French resistance to admitting a re-armed Germany. Guatemala nationalized large tracts of fruit trees belonging to an American company. Further—in Iran a new government, perhaps with communist help, nationalized oil concessions belonging to the British, threatening the flow of oil to world markets. Finally, massive uncertainty filled the vacuum left by the death of Josef Stalin in March. Eisenhower presented his “Chance for Peace” speech, aimed at Soviet leadership only to be shunned by silence from the Kremlin. Further, the President’s recently installed national security staff showed signs of concerns as they looked for vision and policy direction from their new leader.

Eisenhower’s staff as well as the American public contemplated the President’s intentions. John Foster Dulles campaigned on the U.S. regaining the foreign policy initiative, seeking a free, democratic, unified Germany, and “roll back” communist control of Eastern Europe. Further with no armistice signed in Korea, many Americans encouraged Eisenhower to take a more belligerent stance toward Soviet Power.

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15 Christopher Preble, The Uses of Threat Assessment in Historical Perspective: Perception, Misperception, and Political Will, (The Cato Institute, Washington DC), 2
From the President’s position, he was not happy with the crisis-oriented US defense program or the record defense budget he inherited. Eisenhower believed budgeting to meet the year of “maximum danger,” or 1954 when the USSR was projected to achieve nuclear plenty, would bankrupt the country. He sought to develop a balanced, integrated defense posture for the indefinite future, as promised.¹⁸

This spring afternoon, four months after his inauguration, Eisenhower sat with his Secretary of State in the Solarium Room watching, as the world turned toward communism. Truman’s strategy for an uncertain future, based on George Kennan’s framework, called for the military containment of Soviet expansion and the exercise of economic and political pressure to eventually defeat communism. An alternative strategy, fathered by Paul H. Nitze, advocated a primarily military strategy to wrest the Soviet satellite nations from communist domination. Secretary Dulles endorsed the Nitze policy as best for the US, to which Eisenhower countered, “It’s the minds and hearts of men that must be won.”

The Eisenhower Administration and the next US Presidential Administration face similar issues. Eisenhower struggled with how to plan for an increasingly uncertain future, over an extended period of time, with extremely high stakes and little consensus on how to deal with the growing strategic threat. The next US President will face the same. Eisenhower long believed that the best way to formulate national policy in a democracy was to gather the best qualified people with opposing views and carefully listen to them debate the issue at hand.¹⁹

**President Eisenhower—Project Solarium and Strategic Planning**

In mid-1953, Eisenhower began a process in response to the issues above. Most interesting—the answers sprang not from the President, as the American public might expect today, but from a process. The exercise, code named Solarium, remained classified for many years. Many pundits assumed Eisenhower replaced the Truman policy of containment with “roll back,” and “brinksmanship,” and simply called it the “New Look” or Massive Retaliation.²⁰ In actuality, this new Republican President adopted something akin to his Democrat predecessor’s policy. The “New Look” or Massive Retaliation, albeit a more forceful brand of containment,

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was nothing of the approach John Foster Dulles proposed in the 1952 GOP platform of a physical “roll back” of communist forces.\textsuperscript{21}

The Solarium documents were finally declassified in 1985. The declassification revealed George Kennan, the author of the “long telegram,” was deeply involved in the project. Kennan not only provided the Democratic Truman administration with the original intellectual framework of containment but also mapped out the main thrust of the Republican Eisenhower strategy in a true bi-partisan manner.

Solarium brought together three multi-faceted task forces of seven members each, from all branches of the US Government, to examine separately and in detail the most promising approaches being considered at the time by the national security establishment.

\textbf{Task Force A:} Lead by George Kennan--proposed slight modifications to the status quo—“1) Maintain over a sustained period armed forces to provide for the security of the United States and to assist in the defense of vital areas of the free world; 2) To continue to assist in building up the economy, military strength and cohesion of the free world; and 3) Without materially increasing the risk of general war, to continue to exploit the vulnerabilities of the Soviets and their satellites by political, economic, and psychological measures.”

\textbf{Task Force B:} Chaired by Major General James McCormack, proposed a “line in the sand” policy. “1) To complete the line now drawn in the NATO area and Western Pacific so as to form a continuous line around the Soviet bloc beyond which the U.S. will not permit Soviet or satellite military forces to advance without general war; 2) To make clear to the Soviet rulers in an appropriate and unmistakable way that the U.S. has established and determined to carry out this policy; and 3) to reserve freedom of action, in the event of indigenous Communist seizure of power in countries on our side of the line, to take all measures necessary to re-establish a situation compatible with the security interests of the U.S. and its Allies.”\textsuperscript{22}

\textbf{Task Force C:} Lead by Admiral R. L. Connolly; Rollback as promised by GOP—An effort “to force the Soviets to shift their efforts to holding what they already have…” 1) Increase efforts to

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{22} Bowie, Waging Peace, Cutler memorandum for the record, May 9, 1953; FR, 1952-54, 2:399-400, 412, 126.
disturb and weaken the Soviet bloc and to accelerate the consolidation and strengthening of the free world; 2) To create the maximum disruption and popular resistance throughout the Soviet Bloc; 3) The policy is not designed to provoke war… but it involves substantial risk of general war.”

The teams spent six weeks at the National War College deliberating their strategies. On 16 July 1953, President Eisenhower listened intently to all options, stood, congratulated the participants and stated his conclusions. Eisenhower authorized the Solarium findings as the basis for a new national security policy for consideration by the National Security Council. Solarium findings recommended “a U.S. capability for a strong retaliatory offensive, a base for mobilization, and a continental defense;” a “strong, independent, and self-sufficient groupings of nations friendly to the United States centering on Western Europe, on the Far East, and a position of strength in the Middle East.”

The findings essentially updated and continued Truman’s policy of political, diplomatic, economic, and if necessary military containment of the USSR. What Eisenhower advanced, through the Solarium Project was the institutionalization of a bi-partisan, well thought out, debated and argued policy of containment. Vetting the strategy as he did, it became the structural elements in the foundation of US Cold War policy from 1953-1991.

President Eisenhower—Leadership:

Eisenhower succeeded due in large part to his leadership—he understood the value of being challenged by his advisors on even his most basic assumptions regarding the nature of the new “cold” war. He understood the benefits of disagreement and sought to institutionalize such debate in an inclusive, intentional and integrated fashion.

Eisenhower’s Solarium processes extended into the NSC and his Oval Office practice that could mitigate risks, but could not remove them. He set the basic lines for the implementing of the containment strategy. The programs and policies were not without flaws. Like those before and after him, the policies rested on fallible judgments regarding external conditions; the conduct of allies, opponents, and others; and the impact of U.S. actions, which could well prove

26 Bowie, Waging Peace 256.
mistaken. Further, the New Look did not lead directly to the demise of the Soviet Union. The USSR collapse and the peaceful resolution of the Cold War was ultimately due to the bankruptcy of the system and recognition by leaders that reality and the necessity for basic reform. Containment, nevertheless, provided the indispensable external context for producing that outcome.28

The original concept of the containment strategy belongs to the Truman administration. Yet effective containment depended on the ability of the U.S. to adapt the concept to radically changing conditions and to implement it—indefinately. Eisenhower’s strategy reshaped the implementation to one compatible with the new context and sustainable for the long term. Recognizeing his critical conribution does not degrade that of either his predecessor or successor. It does, however, illustrate Eisenhower possessed the key elements required in implementing strategy, mentioned in chapter one, organizational capacity, political skill, and contextual intelligence. Ideas are merely campaign promises without the leadership ability to implement.

As Eisenhower left office; America’s world position was preeminent; the country had achieved something close to “peace with strength,” notwithstanding perceived threats in Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam. In that same month Dwight D Eisenhower handed to John F Kennedy an elaborate, sophisticated system for national security management and strategy.

Eisenhower was elected on a never-implemented “roll back” or “policy of boldness” toward Moscow platform. Solarium proved to be a gathering of bi-partisan giants to include George Kennan, who had served primarily in Democratic administrations. The power of the project suspended the GOP’s original concept of “roll back” as the members were enlightened by the debate and discussion. Kennan later remarked that President Eisenhower took command of the Solarium process, demonstrating “his intellectual ascendancy over every man in the room.”

No president before or after Eisenhower received such a systematic and focused briefing on the threats facing the nation’s security and the possible strategies for coping with them.29 Further, there is no evidence that such high-level strategy meetings occur today even in light of this “Long War.” In December of 2003, then-Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz did preside over a secret "Solarium II" meeting to develop a grand strategy. The President did not chair the meeting and participants revealed to the Washington Post that Wolfowitz read unrelated

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28 Bowie, Waging Peace; 256.
29 Bowie, Waging Peace 127.
briefing papers during presentations. As such Solarium II came to no hard conclusions. At a Stanford University presentation, General Richard B. Myers stated, “I can count on one hand the number of times we met in the White House to discuss long term strategy.” Efforts of grand strategy demand presidential leadership and vision combined with focused teams of giants as witnessed during the original Solarium gathering.

Over half a century later, the policies and processes of President Eisenhower take on a new and very wise aura. The concept of a “meeting of the minds” in a Solarium type atmosphere ended when Eisenhower left office. Perhaps it was President Kennedy’s youth or perhaps it was politically motivated—Democrats not wanting anything that was originally Republican--but at this point America would be wise to re-investigate the systems of President Eisenhower, most specifically starting with a Project Solarium type debate and reinvigorating our National Strategy process.

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31 Richard B. Myers, former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 Oct 2001-30 Sep 2005, quoted at The Hoover Institution’s Spring Retreat Dinner Speech, Stanford University, CA, 28 Apr 2008
Chapter 3
US Grand Strategy:

“However beautiful the strategy, you should occasionally look at the results.”
-Winston Churchill

“Most people assume there are all sorts of ‘master plans’ being pursued throughout the US government. But, amazingly, we are still searching for a vision to replace the decades-long containment strategy that America pursued to counter the Soviet threat.”
— Thomas Barnett

Given the choice, would the next US President choose the international situation in January 1953 over the one that he/she will inherit in Jan 2009? Today, the world is more dynamic, but the danger was no less in the early 1950s. The US was in a similar state of strategic ambiguity. Truman’s containment policy evolved in stages between 1945 and 1953, largely in reaction to Soviet operations. Following the onset of the Korean War, Truman adopted a more aggressive strategy documented as NSC-68, to counter the threat posed by Soviet nuclear capability. NSC-68’s objectives and programs focused on coercing “rollback” of Soviet power through military predominance before the “year of maximum danger.” NSC-68 led to tripling the defense budget and the NATO decision to re-arm West Germany. By the time Truman left office, efforts to pursue this strategy produced a confused legacy of objectives, policies, and programs in disarray.33

In January 2009, the new American President inherits: The rise of China and India, Russia’s resurgence on the world stage, Europe’s evolution, globalization’s powerful and unpredictable effect, and national, cultural and religious reactions to globalization…naming only a few. Any strategy must go beyond the usual National Security Strategy rhetoric and embrace what Eisenhower knew to be true. The U.S. must clearly present and articulate concise priorities with a well defined strategy to communicate what this reluctant hegemon represents to its populace and the world.

Leadership and Strategy:

Strategy, derived from the Greek word strategia, literally means "generalship."

33 Bowie, Waging Peace, 124.
Generalship is defined as “skillful management or leadership.” Strategy also describes the means by which policy is effected, accounting for Carl Clausewitz’ famous statement that war is the continuation of political relations via other means. In his book, *Strategy*, Basil Liddell Hart examines wars and battles from the time of the ancient Greeks through World War II. Concluding his review, Liddell Hart arrives at the short definition of strategy: "the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy.”

National grand strategy, well above military strategy, involves more than simply the application of military forces. National strategies serve as guidance for the implementation of plans, programs, campaigns, and other activities. Any national strategy must consider all the economic, political, diplomatic, military, and informational instruments to promote a nation’s interest or secure a state from its enemies. Strategies released to the public may also serve political purposes designed to appeal to certain constituencies, influence public opinion, or intimidate the enemy.

Influential strategies make tough choices—allocating scarce resources, setting clear goals, or establishing priorities and further adjusting the strategy when those resources, goals and priorities are in conflict. Strategy bridges the gap between policy and tactics. Strategic theory cannot, however, obtain a high level of predictive value. Further, the study of strategic behavior falls within the social sciences where few laws exist. At best the social scientist can give only a probability that a particular action will be followed by the desired result. Strategy is more art than science, a framework, and most importantly it should cast a vision—provide a rallying point and direction. As such, without a coherent strategy—the nation exists in a state of ambiguity with a lack of focus—wasting resources and effort.

Strategy creation is not easy. Returning to the Greek definition, it demands skillful leadership, a leader not afraid to make tough choices on what America represents strategically and allocating recourses and vision to achieve those ends.

**National Security Strategy (NSS): Context and Foundation**

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The basic objective of national security strategy is to protect the country’s people and the American way of life. The current NSS concept was developed by the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act (GNA). The Act requires the President to submit an annual report on the National Security Strategy. The NSS is a statement of interests, and objectives, along with the concepts for achieving them. The report was designed as a formal Congressional presentation of grand strategy lending coherence to the budgeting process. A well-written NSS provides Congress a clear idea of resources required to support the strategy.

There are two major issues with the current NSS process. The first issue is the actual production of the strategy creates the false impression that its formulation is a rational and systemic process. In fact, strategy formulation, within the executive branch, between other government branches and Congress is intensely political and the national strategy emerges only after protracted bargaining, compromise and possible dilution. Strong leadership and a clearly articulated overarching vision must guide the bureaucracy to ensure the end product meets the original intent.

Faced with a fast-paced media-oriented world, the President can be expected to resist producing a static, written report detailing his strategic vision. Politically, there is recognition the NSS is not the only, the principal, or even the most desirable means for the President to articulate publicly his strategic vision. Personal testimonies by the administration before Congress—supported by Presidential speeches, creating a coherent campaign of public awareness and buy-in to the electorate—is perhaps preferable in influencing public opinion and resource allocation. Understandably, this view relegates the NSS to a mere piece of paper before Congress.

Second, strategy is not limited to the NSS or the elected officials producing it. There are pockets of planning activity within many departments and agencies, particularly Defense and State with insufficient overarching integration for these strategy cells. Strategy at these department levels is comprehensive planning but usually from the perspective of that particular agency. NSS takes its roots from Goldwater Nichols, a DoD reform act—as such the NSS tends to take on a very military flavor. Grand strategy must address much more than military aims, but

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38 Ibid.
in the current NSS construct this integration is difficult. Further departmental strategy is devoid of the political dynamic provided by those who have won elections, providing the authority to set future directions of security policy and strategy.\textsuperscript{39} A future Solarium construct might bring all branches together, debating, contrasting, and pontificating the president’s vision and direction for the nation in an integrated fashion.

The NSSs submitted by the Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, and William J. Clinton administrations usually did little more than simply restate policies already in effect. The reports were bland, inciting little discussion on Capitol Hill or elsewhere, and appeared more akin to promotional brochures on administration policy than carefully reasoned documents of national security. In 1994, an angry Senator Strom Thurmond (S.C.- R), involved in passing the Goldwater-Nichols Act, complained that the reports "seldom met … expectations."\textsuperscript{40} Thurmond further noted that reports tended to be late, if presidents even bothered to submit them at all.

**National Security Strategy: Today**

National Security Strategy must be grounded in social and cultural realities, with a focus on achieving clearly defined objectives, and a call for resources adequate to achieve those objectives as well as cope with unanticipated conditions.\textsuperscript{41} It is critical to acknowledge the difference between the strategic, the operational, and the tactical. Today, the importance of the battles in Iraq and Afghanistan can not be overstated, yet they are operational fronts in a larger conflict. The national grand strategy must rise above these theaters and address the position, the plan, and the direction for the US today and into the future. Retired Army General Barry McCaffrey, a Vietnam and Persian Gulf combat veteran, notes our "…strategy is unbalanced, incoherent and underfunded."\textsuperscript{42}

The current administration often refers to the pledge of spreading democracy, as the premise of the US security strategy. "With the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world," President George W. Bush stated in his second inaugural address. Yet the strategy lacks in ways, means and there are no clearly defined milestones on the path to the end state. In what might

\textsuperscript{39} Snider, The National Security Strategy, 15.
amount to frustration, Former Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld wrote in a memo leaked in October 2003, "Today, we lack metrics to know if we are winning or losing the global war on terror." Without a clear, well thought out strategy, there are no metrics.43

The US Government has not lacked in action, but failed in want of a cohesive, well articulated plan, and overarching strategy. Attempts at efforts like Solarium II, mentioned in the previous chapter, should be applauded yet they failed in delivery. The importance of a global strategy in light of a new war, a new enemy, fought in territory like Afghanistan in which the US had little in the way of war plans is imperative.

The Global War on Terror—if the conflict is indeed global, a war, and confined to the tactic of terror—requires the next President of the United States to articulate a strategy to unify US efforts across this country’s diplomatic, military and economic spectrum. No agency alone can plan its way through this conflict. It requires innovative, imaginative, bold and audacious leadership, something that is hard to come by in bureaucracies at times.

There is no evidence that the current administration ever held a grand strategy session with its principals in which all the variables were laid on the table: the costs of the global war on terrorism, the strategic goal, and the real costs, in dollars and lives, of an Iraq invasion. In February 2003, the administration did release the "National Strategy for Combating Terrorism," which was mainly a statement of aims, boilerplate, and it was drowned out by the Iraq war the following month. As former national security adviser Brent Scowcroft quoted, the administration still needs to study "the roots of terrorism and not the manifestations of it." 44

George Kennan's famous Long Telegram in February 1946, described "the sources of Soviet conduct," and culminated in NSC-68 in the spring of 1950. NSC-68 was not boilerplate. This internal policy document included precise requests for defense spending and projections for how America eventually defeats the Soviet Union. It did take about four years, but America developed a strategy that ultimately prevailed.45 The U.S. is seven years into this generational conflict. The incoming US President will have a short window of opportunity to gather the leaders from all over the federal government and blaze a new trail for America. It is time for something different, time for an “out of the box” long term security strategy.

Dr David Mets, of the US Air Force’s Research Institute notes, “Strategy rarely survives

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43 Hirsh, 9/11 and Counting, B01.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
the first contact with any enemy, but that the exercise of making strategy is highly useful nonetheless because it accustoms the mind to the issues it will have to face once the battle is joined, and quicken the responses.”

Strategy is not always about the answers; many times it is more about the questions. President Eisenhower was acutely aware of the importance of strategic planning and the associated questions. He often quoted Count Helmuth von Moltke that, "planning is everything; plans are nothing." By engaging in a well-structured planning exercise, such as Project Solarium III, one becomes prepared for the unexpected. While the short-term utility of such an exercise might be limited, the long-term benefits include: 1) it provides strategic thinkers with an opportunity to move beyond the day-to-day problems; 2) a solid methodology would help ensure the integrity of any final decision that is made; and 3) a methodology is reusable whereas a policy may not be.

**National Security Strategy: The Future**

First, since the end of the Cold War, the United States corporately has not devoted the requisite intellectual and political energy necessary to truly understand its relative position in detail and the real obstacles, risks, and costs associated with maintaining that position over time. The greater “United States” can donate the corporate will, but it takes a lion to direct America. A strong leader must provide the plan on how the country will achieve the envisioned end state.

Second, the United States has yet to develop a grand strategy that employs all of the enormous potential embodied in its instruments of power to secure its strategic position and influence effectively against direct and indirect challenges. Finally, the nation’s strategy elite must identify and articulate the principal aspects of the resultant grand design and both assess and account for the real costs associated with pursuing it in a meaningful way.

In the late 1940s and early 1950s, America confronted similar problems. The US government worried about the spread of communism and feared its forces could take over the world. Through the action of the Truman administration and the deep thinking accompanied by action of the Eisenhower presidency the threat was eventually defeated. This effort was definitely not an overnight success; it took time, thinking, adjustments, patience and above of all a strategy.

America needs to be similarly imaginative today. Cynthia Montgomery at the Harvard Business School notes, “Strategy is not what it used to be—or what it could be.” Her argument is

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46 David Mets, Email dated 12 March 2008, *Chapters 1-3.*
leadership must be placed back into strategy. Strategy is now thought of as an analytical problem to be solved, a left brain exercise of sorts. Strategy is fluid by nature as it must adjust to competition and as such demands continuous, not periodic leadership.49

Why did the U.S. neglect deep thinking strategic planning? Perhaps in part the National Security Strategy process as posed by the Goldwater Nichols Act is a culprit. Has the leadership elite focused on process over substance? In the days of Alexander the Great, Napoleon, Clausewitz, Hap Arnold, strategy was identified as the most important duty of a leader—the person responsible for setting the course of a nation and seeing the journey through. The role encompassed both formulation and implementation—thinking and doing combined. Over many decades, strategy makers met many formulas, equations, economics, and an ever increasingly changing world. In the advent of new processes and thought something has been lost. While gaining depth, strategy has lost breadth and stature. Montgomery notes, “It has become more about formulation and implementation, and more about getting the idea right at the outset than living with a strategy over time.”50

One can, for example, make a cogent argument that foundational Cold War efforts like Kennan’s “long telegram” and his “X” article (“Sources of Soviet Conduct”); NSC 20/4 (“US Objectives with Respect to the USSR to Counter Soviet Threats to US Security”); NSC 68 (“United States Objectives and Programs for National Security”); the Eisenhower Solarium Project; and, finally, NSC 162/2 (“Basic National Security Policy”) established a grand strategic foundation. Further, that this strategic foundation, with some subsequent and at times substantial course corrections and style adjustment, informed and guided strategic decision makers for half a century.51

Strategy is not simply a plan, not just an idea; it is a way of life, a guiding light. Strategy does not just position a nation in its external landscape; it defines what a nation stands for. Watching over a strategy day in and day out is not only a leader’s greatest opportunity to shape the global landscape it is also the greatest opportunity to shape the country itself.

Michèle A. Flournoy and Shawn W. Brimley note in their work “Strategic Planning for US National Security, A Project Solarium for the 21st Century,” three trends caused the decline in strategic planning, at least in the way President Eisenhower envisioned it. First, the special

50 Ibid.
51 Bowie, Waging Peace, 12, 31-32, 155.
assistant to the President for National Security Affairs evolved into a powerful political player. This in turn, has helped propel the NSC staff to a dominant position in the foreign policy process. Second, informal methods of presidential decision-making, while always important in the final calculus of choice, have eclipsed the more structured and formal mechanisms that were once equally valued and prominent in the process. Finally, as presidential administrations focus on crisis management and daily operations, outside entities such as Congress, other government agencies, and think-tanks have attempted to address the strategic planning deficit, with results of varying value. These trends run deep within the currents of national security policy and process, and have greatly influenced the development of American strategy over the last fifty years.

President Bush, much like Truman, has led in the initial phases of this new generational conflict and now a new administration must strategically plan the path America will blaze. Much akin to President Eisenhower taking the Oval Office from Truman, the next president must develop a plan for the future conduct of this conflict. One issue must resonate clearly; this is not just about the current situation in Iraq or Afghanistan. These countries are merely fronts in this war. The new strategy, must address the U.S.’s position in the world and its position as the current hegemon. America may not taunt others with that position, but recognition of the position and what America represents is of the utmost importance.
Chapter 4

“Quantum Look”—A Rough Sketch

“What do you want to achieve or avoid? The answers to this question are objectives. How will you go about achieving your desired results? The answer to this you can call strategy.”

--William E Rothschild

“Perception is strong and sight weak. In strategy it is important to see distant things as if they were close and to take a distanced view of close things.”

- Miyamoto Musashi

Michelangelo once pled “Lord, grant that I may always desire more than I can accomplish.” Without a challenge, many people, companies, nations tend to fall or fade away. Charles Noble observed, “You must have a long-range vision to keep you from being frustrated by short-range failures.” Someone said that only people who can see the invisible can do the impossible. That illustrates the power of vision. But it also indicates that vision can be an elusive quality.  

America needs a vision for its future, vision gives a country direction and confidence—two things it can not do without.

What does America represent in this globalized world? Is the U.S. the proverbial city on the hill or simply a hybrid of the British and Roman Empires with better dentistry and plumbing? Even a global colossus requires leadership and a competent strategy. The goals and objectives of the NSS must always be directed toward achieving the fundamental purposes set out in the US Constitution: "provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity”.

The history of empires and great powers provides many important lessons. First: Power must be husbanded carefully. Second: National might is limited. Third: Choices matter and without leadership, a clear vision, and strategy a country cannot differentiate between preferences and priorities—between what is essential to preserve a nation’s security and what is merely desirable.

America’s current NSS is a strategy of military dominance that diminishes the policies of deterrence, containment, and collective security.\textsuperscript{54} Instead, this “grand strategy” stresses offensive military intervention, preemptive/preventative strikes, and proactive counter-proliferation measures against rogues and other enemies. Put simply, the U.S. security strategy is no longer one of defense but offense. This strategy was satisfactory in 2002 and 2006 when it was first updated. But as the nation stands on the precipice of a national election and the beginning of what indeed will be a long war, are these the ideals that America represents at home and abroad? What Eisenhower knew to be true, is true today… it is about the hearts and minds.

According to recent surveys, over 80 percent of Americans believe that the country is headed in the wrong direction.\textsuperscript{55} It is not geography that is in question, but rather our national purpose, spirit, credibility, competence and leadership.\textsuperscript{56} When American leaders closely examine issues of purpose, spirit, and credibility—questions can be as important as the answers… Senators Sam Nunn and Bill Cohen\textsuperscript{57} asked a series of questions in a Boston Globe article including: How do we restore our government's credibility and competence? How do we rebuild our physical and human capital so that we can face a dynamic world of change with confidence in our ability to compete? How do we promote energy security and reduce our vulnerabilities to the most unstable regions of the world? How do we operate in a complicated world where other nations will not always be "with or against us"? How do we restore America's international leadership role and renew the values for which we have been so long admired? How do we engage and use "smart power" that combines economic, diplomatic, and military strength to achieve national security and foreign policy goals? How do we encourage citizens of every age, race, and creed to act on the premise that we have not just inherited our wonderful country from our parents, but we have borrowed it from our children?

What are the biggest security concerns for America? Nina Hachigian from the Center for American Progress notes the most dire threat to America is a large scale terrorist incident.


\textsuperscript{55} Unknown, Poll: 81 Percent think US on the Wrong Track, Associated Press, 3 April 2008, on line, internet, 3 April 2008 http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5gM5gNpUhbH13vSmaL_FXli0AshnSLwD8VQSSD80.


\textsuperscript{57} William S. Cohen is a former secretary of defense and former Republican senator from Maine. Sam Nunn is a former Democratic senator from Georgia and former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee.
involving WMD. Polls indicate the economy is a concern, terrorism, WMD, energy, climate change—is there something the US can do?

**Solarium III**

Given a future Solarium III scenario comprised of the historic three task forces—optimally one team will serve as the “out of the box” group. This team is tasked to develop a strategy utilizing all the various tools of power the US holds in its quiver—the military, diplomatic, economic, industrial, and informational and further address the concerns of Senator Nunn and Cohen. If America were to look at the global landscape, and given its power and leadership in all of the above—how could it be shaped? Ultimately; America desires security—which may be on the side of impossible, yet worthy of effort. In some minds, security for the U.S. equates to insecurity for others—is it possible for one nation to develop a strategy of security for many nations? If the nation could minimize conflict, open trade and economic channels, deepen global understanding, and minimize coercion and threats from wrong-doers—would the country find it a worthy strategy? In today’s globalized world, America’s National Security Strategy must go beyond defense and cover prosperity as well.

Given the above ends—the ways, entitled “Quantum Look (QL),” is offered. Of course a gathering such as Solarium III demands the greatest minds and leaders in the nation to compile their strategies given the President’s guidance on what he or she saw as a possible future. As Eisenhower provided the original Solarium cast with three options, the next US President must present his/her options to the teams as well. As the name implies—QL would introduce a sudden and significant change, and assist the US in ends, a world in which US and allied interests are secure—ending avoidable rivalry.

Each of the three overarching focus areas of Quantum Look is much broader than National Security. Each of the three focus areas is a book in and of itself; and touched on for illustration purposes. This concept branches National Strategy from purely foreign policy into the domestic arena as well. In broad terms QL deals with education, energy, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Each focus area is a metaphorical pyramid of sorts, with the pinnacle focused on national security and the base in domestic arena (see diagram below).

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Yes, America faces daunting issues in Iraq and Afghanistan that must be worked with a coherent operational plan. QL does not ignore those operational fronts, but seeks to reach beyond the operational to the strategic. The question is: how to best use American power in ways that advance our interests and values while avoiding strategic overreach? The key is to be watchful, thoughtful, and engaged, vice reactive—yet always watching over the strategy for opportunities and course corrections.

**Quantum Look**

**EDUCATION: International Cultural/Spiritual Understanding and Education (National Defense Education Act II)**

Education is the cornerstone of Quantum Look, a key to national security, and a historic focus area. The pinnacle of the educational pyramid focuses on a global understanding of cultures different from the west, especially the Muslim culture and religion. Religion is life to many, not just Muslims, but Christians, Jews, Buddhists, etc—their life and world view is based on how their religion, their spirituality sees the world. Further, America is a religious nation, but neither US foreign policy scholars nor practitioners have taken religion very seriously.\(^6\) Failure

to acknowledge this spiritual world view quickly leads to disenfranchised relationships. The second piece—and a deeper foundation of this educational pyramid requires a focus on maintaining a global educational edge.

*Cultural Understanding*: The US needs to understand Islamic culture… and the Muslim world must understand the West. Bruce Hoffman of Georgetown University has testified that until America recognizes the importance of understanding its enemy, it will remain forever on the defensive, unable to neutralize terrorist propaganda, to successfully penetrate terrorist ranks to sow dissention from within, nor prevent operations.\(^6\) One important aspect to national security is Islamic Studies. Today there are few universities, if any, that offer anything close to programs the country saw in Soviet Studies. Gen John Abizaid, former CENTCOM Commander, notes there were hundreds of thousands of soviet experts during the Cold War. When he took command of CENTCOM and tasked with overseeing the war effort in the mid east, he asked for Islamic experts to assist in the war effort and found there were maybe 200.\(^6\) America does not understand the Muslim world as a whole. This is by no means an apology. The Muslim world possesses a poor understanding of the West as well, but who will lead the effort to educate both sides? America is a country of leaders and needs to invest intellectually just as the country did at one time to understand Lenin, Stalin, and Marx. Does the average American relate to the names of Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, Ayman Al Zawahiri, Muqtada Al-Sadr, Ali Al Sistani and Osama Bin Laden the same as we did the Communist leaders of the past?

Samuel P. Huntington mentioned—it was "The West and the Rest": the West standing alone, and eight civilizations dividing the rest - Latin American, African, Islamic, Sinic, Hindu, Orthodox, Buddhist and Japanese. And in this post-cold-war world, Islamic civilization would re-emerge as a nemesis to the West. Huntington put the matter in stark terms: "The relations between Islam and Christianity, both Orthodox and Western, have often been stormy. Each has been the other's Other. The 20th-century conflict between liberal democracy and Marxist-Leninism is only a fleeting and superficial historical phenomenon compared to the continuing and deeply conflictual relation between Islam and Christianity."

Huntington notes demography best tells the story: where more than 40 percent of the world population was "under the political control" of Western civilization in the year 1900, that

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\(^6\) Hachigian and Sutphen, The Next American Century, 32.
\(^6\) John Abizaid, Interview and comments at West Point Alumni Meeting, 15 March 2008.
share had declined to about 15 percent in 1990, and is set to come down to 10 percent by the year 2025. Conversely, Islam's share has risen from 4 percent in 1900 to 13 percent in 1990, and could be as high as 19 percent by 2025.\textsuperscript{64}

It is not pretty at the frontiers between societies with dwindling populations - Western Europe being one example, Russia another - and those with young people making claims on the world. Huntington predicted this gathering storm. A “Clash of Civilizations” is Huntington’s term. America has the intellectual power to stand in the gap and address the issues through mutual understanding and education.

\textit{Global Educational Edge:} American leadership in science and technology is challenged by powers in Asia and Europe.\textsuperscript{65} The U.S. has known for some time that it needs to improve pre K-12 education, especially in math and science. As a share of GDP, U.S. federal funding for research in the physical sciences and engineering has been on a steady decline by half since 1970.\textsuperscript{66} 55% of America’s doctoral students in engineering are foreign born.\textsuperscript{67} It has been twenty-five years since Ronald Reagan released \textit{A Nation at Risk} in 1983. In that report the President stated, “The educational foundations of our society are presently being eroded by a rising tide of mediocrity that threatens our very future as a Nation and a people.”\textsuperscript{68} Since then there have been a number of panels, studies, commissions, and books pointing out US shortcomings, but no political will or security direction behind it.

There is a very real prospect that the U.S. is losing its innovation edge.\textsuperscript{69} Technological improvements have accounted for up to 50% of U.S. GDP growth and some 65% of productivity growth since World War II.\textsuperscript{70} Education is the bellows that fans the fires of America’s technological edge.

\textit{NDEA II:} In 1958, in response to the Soviet launch of Sputnik, President Eisenhower proposed the National Defense Education Act (NDEA). The NDEA inspired generations of US students to

\textsuperscript{64} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{65} Cohen and Nunn, Changing Our Direction.
\textsuperscript{66} Hachigian and Sutphen, The Next American Century, 126.
\textsuperscript{67} Hachigian and Sutphen, The Next American Century, 127.
\textsuperscript{69} Hachigian and Sutphen, The Next American Century, 116.
\textsuperscript{70} Hachigian and Sutphen, The Next American Century, 117.
pursue study in fields vital to national security and aided the nation in establishing its dominance in science and technology for the next half century. The program also led to the establishment of Soviet Studies Programs all over America. The NDEA has largely expired, approaching its 50th anniversary, the national security and economic challenges facing the nation are as daunting as ever. To meet them, the US needs to inspire a new generation of students to pursue degrees in areas critical to national defense and homeland security. In January 2009 the next president has an opportunity to grab the ideas of Eisenhower and form an NDEA II. An NDEA II might include: portable graduate fellowships; institutional traineeships; incentives to create Islamic Studies Programs, professional science and engineering programs; undergraduate loan assistance; grants to support new and innovative undergraduate curriculum and research programs; grants to expand K-12 education outreach; summer training and research opportunities for K-12 teachers; and foreign language educational tax breaks; national laboratory and federal service professional incentives; and additional funds for program evaluation.

Education beyond the security implications are of incredible importance. The importance of improving US human capital and as Nunn and Cohen questioned—How do we rebuild our physical and human capital so that we can face a dynamic world of change with confidence in our ability to compete? The answer in light of Quantum Look: develop educational trade space with the Muslim world, a formalized exchange program between the West and the Muslim world, one of International Cultural/Spiritual Understanding and Education. Universities and government education programs must develop programs and curriculum to assist in bridging this cultural gap. Second, the U.S. must posture itself to recapture the technological edge it once had. Finally education takes a long time… this is a generational issue, patience, a plan, and leadership are key.

Education and a technological edge enable America to develop systems that not only protect the continental United States, but the world. Education dovetails into the second area of Quantum Look.

**WMD: Nuclear Weapon Nullification/Open Sourcing**

The world first learned of nuclear weapons in 1945 when the United States dropped two atomic bombs on Japan in an effort to bring about the swift end of World War II. This was
followed by the shock of the Soviet Union's first nuclear test, in 1949, far more quickly than US experts had predicted. The nuclear arms race was born. Vice President Dick Cheney noted in a recent presentation, "In 1972, nine countries had ballistic missiles, today, it is at least 27. And that includes hostile regimes that oppress their own people, seek to intimidate and dominate their neighbors and actively support terrorist groups." Stopping the spread of WMD to terrorists is thus an urgent goal, perhaps the most urgent goal, in regards to immediate US security interests.

Former Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and George Schultz, former Secretary of Defense William Perry and former chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee Sam Nunn jointly declare: “The world is now on the precipice of a new and dangerous era. We endorse the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.” These leaders have set out a very detailed plan on how to achieve a very admirable goal. Two jointly published Wall Street Journal articles and several meetings with global leaders illustrate there is significant interest in their plan. Whether the elimination goal is realized or not nuclear weapon nullification is of strategic importance.

If nuclear weapons could not be eliminated, could they be nullified? What if nuclear weapons just did not matter…what would that take? This is another dual pronged effort. In March 1983, President Reagan sought a way to render nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete." The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) was indeed a bold and audacious proposal. SDI sought to use ground-based and space-based systems to protect the United States from attack by strategic nuclear ballistic missiles. With the demise of the USSR, America’s chances of being attacked by multiple Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) has lessened, but not disappeared. First, the National Missile Defense program needs to continue and grow to a Global Missile Defense system. Second, R&D must be conducted on how to track radioactive material worldwide.

Proliferation of nuclear weapons into terrorist hands is a nightmare scenario. Michael Levi, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and author of the book *On Nuclear Terrorism*, notes “We should be skeptical if we're told that pulling off a nuclear attack is easy, but we should be smart about making it even harder.” Further, with energy and environmental concerns growing globally—nuclear power is an easy choice. As countries look to nuclear power, the nuclear fuel cycle can enable certain groups to weaponize the material. In turn we face the possibility of making the planet green while at the same time making it glow through proliferation of nuclear material.

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**Global Missile Defense**: The QL nullification process takes form in two steps. First, *Global* Missile Defense or US National Missile Defense (NMD) proliferated into a global missile defense system of open sourced technology. The NMD program posses to develop and maintain an effective, and Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty compliant system that will protect the United States against limited ballistic missile threats, including accidental/unauthorized launches or Third World threats.

A key component in Global Missile Defense proposal is the sharing of technology to all interested states. Further, an agreement to share new technology as it is developed. The arguments for and against such a shield are legend, but a shared technology and a shared shield is good for all nations. In the end, only an attack from a myriad of missiles would stand any chance of success. This limits the ability of small, rouge, or emerging countries from directly threatening even their closest neighbors with shield technology.

America’s determination to build a missile defense system is perceived by many, including China and Russia, as a means to neutralize their nuclear deterrent. The technology must be open sourced, from the beginning, the way President Ronald Reagan envisioned it. Reagan offered to share the original SDI technology with the Soviet Union.72 Once the technology is developed, interested countries would be free to develop their own defense. The US has embarked on cooperative missile defense design with Germany, Italy, Israel, and Japan. France is experimenting with its own defensive capability as well.73 Other options are in development to include advanced laser technology; both ground and aircraft based systems hold great promise in missile defense. Sharing the technology openly only adds to the nullification of such weapons.

**Global Nuclear Tracking**: Once the missile threat is diminished or mitigated, enemies will seek to insert nuclear weapons into countries via other means. It is highly unlikely that Al Qaeda or Hezbollah will acquire sophisticated missiles for an attack against the US. However, such groups may seek other delivery methods. The threat of a human or vehicle borne weapon would remain, not as disastrous, but still a threat. Fortunately, the combination of tools and materials needed for fashioning a nuclear bomb, and the chemical residues, are unique, and can in theory,

73 Henriksen, The Legacy of Reykjavik, 43.
be tracked. The US leads in development of technology to track radioactive products and waste. What QL proposes is United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency (UN IAEA) level laws that would require all countries to insert a tracking mechanism or isotope into nuclear material. This, in theory, would enable agencies to track nuclear material world wide (preferably from space-based assets). The IAEA would conduct inspections for compliance of all nuclear facilities and be alerted when material was moved in a suspicious manner.

These systems will never give any country a 100% effective defense, at least not in the near future. Reagan wrote in his autobiography, he “never viewed the SDI as an impenetrable shield—no defense could even be expected to 100% effective.” The deterrent aspect is, however, huge. Once an enemy knows missiles can be shot down and radioactive material can be tracked—they will be forced to look at other avenues of attack. Professor Scott Sagan, political science professor and co-director of Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation, proposes a “defense in depth” to counter the nuclear threat. Sagan offers seven steps including the physical security offered at nuclear facilities, second line defenses on nuclear plants, transportation surveillance, border security, monitors in cities, and enhanced emergency response capabilities. He notes that each level alone enhances the chances of nuclear material falling in the wrong hands by about 10%, yet when one combines all levels together statistically reduces the enemies’ chance of success. “Defense in depth” combined with the two steps proposed in Quantum Look (defense shield and tracking) may offer such a small chance of success that nuclear weapons are in essence nullified.

Of course the technology is key—a technological edge enabled by education, but given a global push to truly nullify these weapons, it is a matter of time, funds, energy and leadership. First the shield, followed with tracking technology—all the while perfecting Dr Sagan’s “defense in depth” and eventually the dream of a world free of nuclear weapons will be realized once the weapons are no longer effective.

Education, cultural understanding, and the ending of America’s constant game of “whack-a-mole” with any country perceived of gaining a nuclear arsenal, further enables the third step in Quantum Look—this greatly assists in the third realm of QL.

**ENERGY: Alternative Energy Materialization**

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74 Hachigian and Sutphen, The Next American Century, 35.
75 Henriksen, The Legacy of Reykjavik, 37.
Energy security is a huge issue on a global scale, another topic that fills volumes of books and articles. The world faces issues with possible climate change, state controlled oil companies, and massive pollution issues in China and India—naming only a few. Energy security is radioactive politically and polls very high in concern for potential voters in America. Yet it is not clear any leader really knows what energy security is and the potential issues are far enough in the future that most political leaders will be out of office before having to deal with any fallout. The US can develop regulatory and policy issues, but the key is to offer options for energy—A matrixed approach to energy…nuclear, solar, winds, hydro, all while looking for new opportunities to exploit new concepts. The issues are many, but what is the global leader doing to shape the outcome? Or how does America answer the Nunn and Cohen question—how do we promote energy security and reduce our vulnerabilities to the most unstable regions of the world?

When America truly focuses its efforts on military and industrial research and development the results are usually quite astounding. Technological development fostered the American moment, increasing military capabilities and economic growth. The U.S. has the opportunity to do the same on the energy front. Innovation is almost always dual use helping the nation in both hard and soft power terms. Ground breaking innovations are scattered throughout the landscape of US ingenuity; the 1951 development of a nuclear power plant in Idaho—a direct offshoot of nuclear weapons. The advent of the personal computer in the 1980 and the development of the internet and satellite technologies are all based on military research and development. Often time the defense establishment takes the lead and alters the market place of an initial US monopoly on the advances.\(^76\)

This nation must constantly ponder that better mouse trap, especially in terms of energy. In his 1974 State of the Union address—President Nixon proposed 1980 as the year of American energy independence.\(^77\) When the gas shortages of the early and mid 1970s were over, the country lost interest. Assuming there is genuine national interest and political will generated by a President focusing on the myriad of benefits from alternative energy sources—the US could further shore up power on the world stage. The nation that breaks the hydrocarbon monopoly rules the 21st century. On the national security front; America is shaping the international

Depriving the oil-producing countries of their major coercive tool also goes a long way to ensuring America’s position as a global leader. The challenge to the next President is to set and hold a date, through a bi-partisan effort, at which point America is 51% energy independent.

Currently the Department of Defense is leading an impressive charge in alternative energy. The US Air Force is flying aircraft today with hybrid fuels and looking to use solar and wind power at bases. An upcoming Air Force energy summit will also explore powering bases with on-site miniature nuclear power plants. The Army is using solar powered shelters, micro fuel cells, solar cells, experimenting with a hybrid combat vehicle and a diesel-electric scout vehicle. Once perfected by the military the market opens up in a huge manner. Civilian companies are already looking to use the USAF’s hybrid fuel on commercial airlines.

The concept of “green” power is attractive to both the “right” and the “left.” Global warming aside, that debate has no place in this paper; taking care of the environment is a very real concern. Proper stewardship of the planet is a concern for all, coupled with the security issues—both parties have a vested interest in seeing alternative energy materialization through.

**UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES**

Of course every one of the three issues above has unintended consequences that must be managed and taken into account. Muslim education must encompass the actual religious ideas—best taught by clerics, priests, etc. The same applies to any attempt to educate on Christian concepts—universities must employ pastors, preachers, etc. This is all about religion, like it or not, and to understand the concepts it must be presented by a believer. This leads to a myriad of issues. The issues with a global defense shield can add to instability in nations that may not possess such a capability. Alternative energy realization, over the long term, could lead to failed states in oil producing nations. Each issue requires leadership, discussion, debate and action—but none is so big as to negate the positive effects of the program.

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CONCLUSIONS:

“I think the magic is over.” French foreign minister Bernard Kouchner recently said about the United States’ global reputation. But as preeminent author, thinker and Stanford scholar, Victor Davis Hanson notes… “It’s never been a great idea to rely on the assessments of French politicians, but the daily news coming out of the U.S. — in terms of our image overseas and beyond — does indeed seem bleak.”

Think for a moment—America is still extremely strong, U.S. problems pale in comparison to its past world wars and depressions, or those of its current competitors. America is still the world’s third-largest petroleum producer with vast amounts of untouched oil and it has the world’s largest coal reserves. Its universities remain the world’s best, and lead the world in cutting-edge technological innovation. America remains a meritocracy where no one is above the law. The U.S. must awaken its national purpose, spirit, credibility, and competence. What America needs is leadership, strategy, boldness, innovative new concepts to propel the nation into the 21st century…the U.S. needs a lion.

Ronald Reagan—one of the greatest world leaders—David Keene notes was idealistic, intractable and optimistic, but he knew where to draw the line. He believed like the founders, that in the end ideas are more powerful than guns and bombs, and while the United States must be strong enough to resist any enemy and defeat aggression, we should resist the temptation to use our power aggressively. Reagan harbored few illusions about the world beyond US shores or American ability to remake the globe in its image. He knew freedom must be won buy those who want it and that democracy can not be force-fed to nations and people who neither understand it nor are prepared to exercise it.

Quantum Look is not about becoming isolationist, it is about strategy, priorities, ideas and how to get the best concepts forward to policy makers. It is about leadership…about lions. Early in this manuscript it was noted the American/Soviet game of checkers in now a multi-dimensional game of chess where ones moves are sometimes made while looking in the mirror—nonetheless—it is still a game of chess. Chess is a game of leadership that teaches strategy, patience, boldness, and the importance of sacrifice. If US leadership can learn these important principles and incorporate these lessons into our national security strategy…America

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will continue to be the greatest nation ever to grace the planet… if not, she may be doomed to repeat the lessons of history, the lessons of empires. The choice belongs to the lions.

_I had another dream about lions at the door_  
_They weren’t half as frightening as they were before_  
_But I’m thinking about eternity_  
_And I’m wondering where the lions are..._  
_I’m wondering where the lions are..._  

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80 Bruce Cockburn, Dancing in the Dragon's Jaws, 1979 “Wondering Where the Lions Are”
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